Title: Detecting Malware on Legacy Hosts with Software-based AttestationSpeaker: Adrian Perrig, Associate Professor, Carnegie Mellon UniversityDate: Thursday, June 12, 10:00am~11:30am 2008Place: ICP lecture room, Science library (과도관 6층 ICP 강의실)Abstract:We design and implement a software-based attestation mechanism that enables an external host to verifiably execute code on an untrusted legacy host. Even if the untrusted host is under the control of an attacker, the verifier either obtains assurance that the untrusted host executed a given software, or can detect that the untrusted host is compromised. Our approach only requires that the untrusted host has the claimed hardware specification, but does not require any special hardware and can thus be executed on legacy hosts. We leverage this software-based attestation to detect malware on a host.Bio: Adrian Perrig is an Associate Professor in Electrical and Computer Engineering, Engineering and Public Policy, and Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University. He earned his Ph.D. degree in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon University, and spent three years during his Ph.D. degree at University of California at Berkeley. He received his B.Sc.degree in Computer Engineering from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL). Adrian''s research interests revolve around building secure systems and include Internet security, security for sensor networks and mobile applications, and trusted computing. More information about his research is available at http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian.